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Regulating the Cyberpunk Reality: Private Body 
Modification and the Dangers of ‘Body Hacking’ 
ZACHARY PAUL BIRNBAUM*© 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Private Body Modification (“PBM”), and particularly cybernetic implants, have 
been contemplated in popular culture and science-fiction for the better part of a 
century.1 Possibilities long thought remote and the product of overactive 
imaginations are now reality such as implanted digital access codes in employees’ 
digits,2 development of direct brain interfaces,3 and various functional and cosmetic 
cybernetic implants.4 However, Data Privacy protections have not advanced in 
tandem with these technologies. Neither the United States nor the European Union 
have adequately addressed the rising issue of PBMs: there is no federal Data Privacy 
standard in the United States5 and; Europe’s present regulatory framework and 
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 1. See Ed Cumming, William Gibson: the man who saw tomorrow, THE GUARDIAN (July 28, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/jul/28/william-gibson-neuromancer-cyberpunk-books; Hari Kunzru, 
Dune, 50 years on: how a science fiction novel changed the world, THE GUARDIAN (July 3, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/03/dune-50-years-on-science-fiction-novel-world; Sean Captain, 
HBO’s Westworld Creators Talk AI, Sentience, And Surveillance, FAST COMPANY (Sep. 30, 2016), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3063743/hbos-westworld-creators-talk-ai-sentience-and-surveillance. 
 2. Associated Press, Cyborgs at work: Swedish employees getting implanted with microchips, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/04/04/cyborgs-work-swedish-
employees-getting-implanted-microchips/. 
 3. Tyler Lacoma, Everything you need to know about Neuralink: Elon Musk’s brainy new venture, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/neuralink-elon-musk/. 
 4. Eyder Peralta, ‘Body Hacking’ Movement Rises Ahead of Moral Answers, NPR (Feb. 27, 2016), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/02/27/468366630/-body-hacking-movement-rises-ahead-of-moral-answers; see 
generally Sigal Samuel, How biohackers are trying to upgrade their brains, their bodies – and human nature, 
VOX (Jun. 25, 2019), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/25/18682583/biohacking-transhumanism-
human-augmentation-genetic-engineering-crispr. 
 5. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
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scheme, the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), does not address PBMs.6 
Globally, Data Privacy protections are lacking.7 
The advent of the new technology of cybernetic implants and ‘body hacking’8 
dependent on personal data has exponentially increased the need for strong, 
comprehensive Data Privacy protections.9 Without such protections, data and 
experiences accrued by the implants and other modifications will not belong to those 
equipped with the body modification.10 This information will belong to the 
manufacturing corporation under licensing agreements, leading to individuals’ data 
being used without direct consent.11  
We are currently amid the Fourth Industrial Revolution.12 The cybernetic 
revolution is poised to bring about the Fifth.13 Before this revolution takes place, a 
privacy framework must be in place and is necessary for responsible uses of 
cybernetics in the non-military space.14 Part II will address the history of cybernetic 
enhancements, from medical applications in subpart II.A15 to the BodyNet in subpart 
II.B.16 Part III will discuss the current status of private sector and individual Data 
Privacy protections.17 Part IV will discuss possible models of regulation for data 
 
 6. Danny Palmer, What is GDPR? Everything you need to know about the new general data protection 
regulations, ZDNET (May 17, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/gdpr-an-executive-guide-to-what-you-need-
to-know/; see infra IV.B. 
 7. Guidehouse, A Roadmap to Global Data Privacy Regulation, GUIDEHOUSE (2019), 
https://guidehouse.com/-/media/www/site/insights/financial-services/2019/fs-data-privacy-overview.pdf. 
 8. Peralta, supra note 4. 
 9. See infra III.A. 
 10. See infra II.B. 
 11. See infra II.B; Daniel Oberhaus, This DIY Implant Lets You Stream Movies From Inside Your Leg, 
WIRED (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/this-diy-implant-lets-you-stream-movies-from-inside-
your-leg/. It should further be noted that manufacturers might very well require the implant user consent to the 
use of their data prior to implantation in certain cases. However, under the future schemes considered in this 
paper, consent would not be required for implantation, and post-implant data use by someone other than the 
implantee would require direct consent from that individual. See infra IV.A; IV.B; IV.C. 
 12. See Kevin Redden, Addressing Automation in the Twenty-First Century, 14 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 499, 499 
(2019); see generally Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond, WORLD 
ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-
what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/. 
 13. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Beyond Technology: The Fourth Industrial Revolution in 
the Developing World May 2019, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/190520_Runde%20et%20al_FourthIndustrialRevolution_WEB.pdf. 
 14. While the military has had and will continue to have an outsized impact on development of cybernetic 
implant technology, their involvement, impact, and policy implications will not be discussed herein. See Matthew 
Gault, Here’s the Pentagon’s Terrifying Plan for Cyborg Supersoldiers, VICE (Dec. 9, 2019), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwee47/heres-the-pentagons-terrifying-plan-for-cyborg-supersoldiers. 
 15. See infra II.A. 
 16. See infra II.B. 
 17. See infra III.A; III.B. 
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accrued through cybernetic implants in subparts IV.A, IV.B, and IV.C.18 This part 
will conclude by advocating for a hybrid model19 based on the computer network20 
and the GDPR models.21 The advent of the Fifth Industrial Revolution without 
safeguards in place either significantly handicaps the technology or risks its 
abandonment until such protections are in place.22 A new hybrid model of regulation 
must be implemented for the coming technology, current existing models and 
protections by themselves are insufficient. 
II. HISTORY OF CYBERNETIC ENHANCEMENTS: FROM SCIENCE-FICTION 
TO REALITY 
As previously mentioned, cybernetics have long had a cherished place in popular 
culture.23 The public has always held a fascination with the ramifications of such 
technology.24 A fascination that unfortunately has not translated to extensive legal 
frameworks related to their specific Data Privacy challenges.25 This section will 
discuss the historical background of cybernetics, focusing particularly on the medical 
industry26 and proceed into a discussion on the rising industry of private body 
modification, brought about by the Transhumanist movement.27 
A. Medical Implants and Cyborgization 
The medical industry has been at the forefront of the body modification industry.28 
While popular culture often depicts cybernetics as a near to far future technology and 
 
 18. See infra IV.A; IV.B; IV.C. 
 19. See infra IV.C. 
 20. See infra IV.A. 
 21. See infra IV.B; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. L 119/1, Art. 
7, 10, and 17. 
 22. See infra IV.A; IV.B; IV.C. 
 23. Supra note 1. 
 24. Charles Towers-Clark, Cyborgs Are Here And You’d Better Get Used To It, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestowersclark/2018/10/01/cyborgs-are-here-and-youd-better-get-used-to-
it/#423b555d746a. 
 25. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 26. See infra II.A. 
 27. See infra II.B. 
 28. See Benjamin Wittes & Jane Chong, Our Cyborg Future: Law and Policy Implications, BROOKINGS 
(Sep. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/our-cyborg-future-law-and-policy-implications/; Arthur 
House, The Real Cyborgs, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 20, 2014), https://s.telegraph.co.uk/graphics/projects/the-
future-is-android/. 
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challenge, the reality is that they have been in place in some form or another since 
the early 16th century.29 
While the technology has come much farther and become much more 
sophisticated since the 1500s, similar ethical and privacy challenges abound.30 
Cybernetic enhancements are a far-ranging, all-encompassing industry that is not 
aided by being reduced to a singular approach and framework.31 To illustrate this 
point are four different types of medical cybernetic advances: 
1. Prosthetic Limbs 
Prosthetics, such as the C-leg implant, introduced by German manufacturer 
Ottobock in 1997,32 can involve microprocessors.33 The C-leg functions by using the 
microprocessor to control the knee joint and its flexion to copy the natural motion of 
an organic limb.34 Small valves are used through a hydraulic system to respond to 
small variations in the data collected by the device through sensors to change the 
pressure and assist in a more natural gait.35 
From a cybernetic perspective, these types of implants do not seem to have Data 
Privacy implications. But, advancements in this type of technology such as WiFi 
powered limbs, or direct brain wave operated limbs, do.36 In fact, several scholars, 
 
 29. William Park, The geniuses who invented prosthetic limbs, BBC (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20151030-the-geniuses-who-invented-prosthetic-limbs. 
 30. John Hewitt, The Future of permanent, fully integrated prosthetic limbs and bionic implants, 
EXTREMETECH (Sep. 16, 2014), https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/189746-the-future-of-permanent-fully-
integrated-prosthetic-limbs-and-bionic-implants (discussing the difficulty in proper fitting of implants and the 
challenge of creating a strong implant to skin interface resistant to infection). 
 31. See Collin R. Bockman, Cybernetic-Enhancement Technology and the Future of Disability Law, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1323–1328 (2010); Leslie Wenning & Richard Cruz, The Ethics of Artificial Vision 
Technology: An Early Step Towards an Ethics of Cybernetic Repair and Augmentation, 5 COLUM. J. OF 
BIOETHICS 59, 60–63 (Fall 2006) (highlighting, on the one hand, different examples of medical cybernetic 
technology and its potential impact on disability laws and, on the other hand, ethical implications of cosmetic 
cybernetic technology). 
 32. MARKO B. POPOVIĆ, BIOMECHANICS AND ROBOTICS 231 (2013). 
 33. Id. at 232–233. 
 34. Id. at 232 (discussing the use of hydraulic cylinders and the microprocessor to mimic the flexing of a 
natural limb and joint). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See John Hewitt, Green implants are coming, and paving the way for implantable WiFi devices, 
EXTREMETECH (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/195674-green-implants-are-coming-
and-are-paving-way-for-implantable-wifi-devices; Karla Lant, New “Interscatter Communication” Could Let 
Your Implants Talk via Wi-Fi, FUTURISM (Sep. 10, 2016), https://futurism.com/new-interscatter-communication-
could-let-your-implants-talk-via-wi-fi; Luke Dormehl, ‘Interscatter communication’ could help your brain 
implant talk to your iPhone, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-
tech/interscatter-communication/. 
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such as Weber Tobias,37 have contemplated criminal implications of the hackability 
of such devices. Posing the question, “could someone overtake the [prosthetic] arm 
and make [it] do something [the individual] didn’t want to do?”38 These criminal 
implications of cybernetic hacking are pervasive across the multitude of devices 
involving this technology.39  
2. Cochlear Implants 
A cochlear implant is an electronic device implanted under a patient’s skin to 
assist their hearing.40 Much like the implants discussed above,41 these devices can be 
hacked.42 This has been established by a team of engineering students at Duke 
University who hacked cochlear implants to allow for customizable setting 
adjustments of the implants to boost effectiveness for individuals.43 
While this team of engineers hacked benignly, the inverse possibility is possible 
by implication.44 With the rise of deepfake video fabrications,45 it does not take a 
strong imagination to consider that with lackluster data protections for these devices, 
a malicious actor could implant auditory hallucinations through this backdoor.46 
Once again, this dangerous possibility of hacking gives rise to criminal Data Privacy 
implications.47 
 
 37. Julia Alexander, The Prosthetic DEKA Arm Is Hackable and a Legal Mess, VICE (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvvvz/the-deka-arm-is-hackable-and-that-might-open-up-a-legal-can-of-
worms. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Benjamin Wittes & Jane Chong, Our Cyborg Future: Law and Policy Implications, BROOKINGS (Sep. 
2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/our-cyborg-future-law-and-policy-implications/. 
 40. COCHLEAR IMPLANTS, Nat’l Inst. on Deafness and Other Comm. Disorders (NIDCD), 
https://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/cochlear-implants (2019). 
 41. Supra II.A.1. 
 42. See Nickolaus Hines, Neural Implants Could Let Hackers Hijack Your Brain, INVERSE (Aug. 5, 2016), 
https://www.inverse.com/article/19148-neural-implants-could-let-hackers-hijack-your-brain; Mary Beth 
Nierengarten, Protecting Medical Devices against Cyberthreats, ENTTODAY (Sep. 24, 2017), 
https://www.enttoday.org/article/protecting-medical-devices-cyberthreats/. 
 43. Ken Kingery, Hacking into a Bionic Ear, DUKE PRATT SCH. OF ENG’G (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://pratt.duke.edu/about/news/hacking-bionic-ear. 
 44. Id. 
 45. CNN Business, Deepfake videos: Inside the Pentagon’s race against deepfakes, CNN (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/01/business/pentagons-race-against-deepfakes/. 
 46. See Hines, supra note 42. 
 47. Julia Alexander, The Prosthetic DEKA Arm Is Hackable and a Legal Mess, VICE (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvvvz/the-deka-arm-is-hackable-and-that-might-open-up-a-legal-can-of-
worms; see also S. 1790, 116th Cong. (2019). This is the first federal legislation specifically geared towards the 
use of “deepfakes”, a growing concern especially in the political space. This represents a growing awareness of 
the concerns expressed in this comment regarding the manipulation of sensory data. See Id.; Matthew F. Ferraro, 
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3. Pacemakers 
Pacemakers are medical devices implanted in a patient’s chest to assist in 
managing issues with heart rate through electrical pulses.48 Hacks of these devices 
have already been acknowledged by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 
March 2019.49 According to the agency, “[a]n attacker with adjacent short-range 
access to an affected product, in situations where the product’s radio is turned on, 
can inject, replay, modify and/or intercept data within the telemetry 
communication.”50 Of further concern is that they also indicated that such attacks 
could be undertaken with little difficulty by low-level attackers.51 The low level of 
sophistication required for such attacks reflects the consensus among cybersecurity 
professionals that these medical devices have historically lacked any data security.52 
Without cybersecurity protections, conceivable scenarios could entail malicious 
actors “shutt[ing] off a defibrillator or command it to deliver a shock to the heart.”53 
Protections for political, business, and intelligence leaders would need to be 
significantly revisited if assassination could be conducted in the privacy of one’s 
office or home on unsuspecting persons with heart conditions.54 
4. Direct Neural Implants 
Direct neural implants and brain-computer interfaces are the latest advance in 
cybernetic enhancements.55 Furthermore, as a category, they implicate the previous 
 
Deepfake Legislation: A Nationwide Survey, WILMERHALE (Sep. 25, 2019), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190925-deepfake-legislation-a-nationwide-survey. 
 48. PACEMAKERS, NIH Nat’l Heart, Lung, and Blood Inst., https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health-
topics/pacemakers (2019). 
 49. Bob Curley, Hackers Can Access Pacemakers, but Don’t Panic Just Yet, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.healthline.com/health-news/are-pacemakers-defibrillators-vulnerable-to-hackers; see Alex Hern, 
Hacking risk leads to recall of 500,000 pacemakers due to patient death fears, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/31/hacking-risk-recall-pacemakers-patient-death-fears-fda-
firmware-update (acknowledging the hacking risks in pacemakers with over 500,000 compromised devices in 
2017. Per DHS, this risk has increased exponentially and thus projections of current risk are likely much higher); 
see also Richard Yonck, The next generation of hackers may target your medical implants, SALON (Mar. 14, 
2020), https://www.salon.com/2020/03/14/the-next-generation-of-hackers-may-target-your-medical-implants/ 
(further explaining current and future projected risk of medical device hacks). 
 50. Curley, supra note 49. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Mary Beth Nierengarten, Protecting Medical Devices against Cyberthreats, ENTTODAY (Sep. 24, 2017), 
https://www.enttoday.org/article/protecting-medical-devices-cyberthreats/. 
 53. Curley, supra note 49. 
 54. Hern, supra note 49. 
 55. Jerry J. Shih et al., Brain-Computer Interfaces in Medicine, 87(3) MAYO CLINIC PROC. 268, 268 (2012). 
The authors explain that a Brain-Computer Interface, or ‘BCI’, “is a computer-based system that acquires brain 
signals, analyzes them, and translates them into commands that are relayed to an output device to carry out a 
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three discussed devices.56 Direct neural implants can be used to control anything 
from a prosthetic limb responding directly to brain impulses, to a pacemaker 
responding to minute electrical changes relayed by the heart to the brain.57 
However, this development, from a security standpoint is among the most 
concerning.58 Whereas other devices involve the localized limb/body specific 
networks,59 a direct neural implant involves, by necessity, a total body network.60 
Consequently, a possibility exists where a hacker enters through a backdoor to the 
device and can access any area where the brain has a connection.61 The rise of the 
deepfake industry makes this possible backdoor to the body’s network even more 
concerning.62 The possibility of direct neural implant hacks raises the risk of false 
memory implantation63 or sensory hallucinations.64 These serious risks underscore 
the need for strong, federalized, cybersecurity protections.65 
 
desired action.” Id. Training of both the user and the artificial intelligence powering the interface are needed for 
optimum use. Id. 
 56. Dom Galeon, Experts: Artificial Intelligence Could Hijack Brain-Computer Interfaces, FUTURISM (Nov. 
20, 2017), https://futurism.com/experts-artificial-intelligence-hijack-brain-computer-interfaces. 
 57. See Shih at 272–274 (detailing current and possible future applications of brain-computer interfaces). 
 58. See Sergio López Bernal et al., Cybersecurity in Brain-Computer Interfaces: State-of-the-art, 
opportunities, and future challenges (2019) (on file with the University of Murcia) at 1, 10-22; Casey Newton, 
Brain-computer interfaces are developing faster than the policy debate around them, THE VERGE (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/7/31/20747916/facebook-brain-computer-interface-policy-neuralink. 
 59. See supra II.A.1; II.A.2; II.A.3. 
 60. See Shih at 268 (explaining that brain-computer interfaces, by virtue of being directly linked to the brain, 
possess direct connectivity to the central nervous system and, thus, the entire individual’s body). 
 61. See Mary Beth Nierengarten, Protecting Medical Devices against Cyberthreats, ENTTODAY (Sep. 24, 
2017), https://www.enttoday.org/article/protecting-medical-devices-cyberthreats/. 
 62. See CNN Business, Deepfake videos: Inside the Pentagon’s race against deepfakes, CNN (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/01/business/pentagons-race-against-deepfakes/. 
 63. Philip Perry, Scientists discover how to implant false memories, BIG THINK (June 15, 2016), 
https://bigthink.com/philip-perry/scientists-have-discovered-how-to-implant-false-memories. 
 64. Nickolaus Hines, Neural Implants Could Let Hackers Hijack Your Brain, INVERSE (Aug. 5, 2016), 
https://www.inverse.com/article/19148-neural-implants-could-let-hackers-hijack-your-brain. 
 65. Infra III.B. 
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B. Private Body Modification: BodyNet and the Danger of Body Hacking 
Private Body Modification is on the rise.66 The transhumanist movement67, 
pioneered by philosopher and journalist Zoltan Istvan,68 has increased the popularity 
of cybernetic enhancement procedures.69 
Procedures rapidly gaining in popularity include, but are not limited to, chips 
directly implanted under the skin that contain digital wallets,70 access cards,71 and 
other electronic personal identification.72 Such implants naturally engender 
cybersecurity concerns as well as ethical ones.73 For example, workplaces in Sweden 
have experimented with microchips embedded under the skin of their employees to 
remove the need for physical key cards, IDs, and the like.74 It remains unknown 
whether these implanted microchips that would replace physical key cards will 
become mainstream or not.75 It is crucial for policymakers and lawmakers to 
 
 66. Tim Adams, When man meets metal: rise of the transhumans, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/29/transhuman-bodyhacking-transspecies-cyborg 
(highlighting the rise of the transhumanist movement and creation of various organizations to promote said 
movement). 
 67. Transhumanism is a philosophical movement having as central construct the belief that the marrying of 
technology to human biology will allow humanity to transcend current physical and mental limitations and 
provide the basis for future evolutionary progress. See Wesley J. Smith, A Transhumanist Runs for President, 
NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/02/transhumanism-zoltan-istvan-
technological-self-perfection-immortality/. 
 68. John Hewitt, An interview with Zoltan Istvan, leader of the Transhumanist Party and 2016 presidential 
contender, EXTREME TECH (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/192385-an-interview-with-
zoltan-istvan-leader-of-the-transhumanist-party-and-2016-presidential-contender. 
 69. Fraser Gillan, The transhumanists who are ‘upgrading’ their bodies, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-49893869 (discussing the increase in popularity of bio-hacking and 
implanting cybernetic devices in one’s own body). 
 70. Steven Melendez, Under My Skin: The New Frontier Of Digital Implants, FAST COMPANY (June 11, 
2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3059769/ive-got-you-under-my-skin-the-new-frontier-of-digital-
implants. 
 71. Maddy Savage, Thousands Of Swedes Are Inserting Microchips Under Their Skin, NPR (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/22/658808705/thousands-of-swedes-are-inserting-microchips-under-their-skin. 
 72. Haley Weiss, Why You’re Probably Getting a Microchip Implant Someday, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 21, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/09/how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-the-
microchip/570946/. Such implants give rise to the concept of the ‘BodyNet’. In other words, a technology 
network operating at and within the human body. This network is solely contained and operational within the 
body but may interface with other networks at certain access points (such as a key card panel in the case of access 
card implants). See Id. 
 73. See Alex Pearlman, The Ethics of Experimentation: Ethical Cybernetic Enhancements, MEDIUM (June 
19, 2017), https://medium.com/@lexikon1/the-ethics-of-experimentation-ethical-cybernetic-enhancements-
48f9ad991769; Andy Miah, The Ethics of Human Enhancement, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Sep. 8, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602342/the-ethics-of-human-enhancement/. 
 74. Savage, supra note 71. 
 75. Weiss, supra note 72. 
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understand the ramifications of technological body modification prior to enacting 
any regulatory or statutory schemes designed to protect consumers as society 
proceeds into the unknowns of the Fifth Industrial Revolution76 and the world 
envisioned by transhumanism.77 Moreover, this procedure is not the sole province of 
Europe, where they possess the slight benefit of the GDPR,78 American-based 
companies have toyed with similar implanted microchips for their employees.79 
There is a stark difference, societally, between these implantations that occur in 
Europe and the implantations that occur in the United States: the lack of 
comprehensive federal cybersecurity protections within the United States and the 
high widespread variability of such protections among the States unlike Europe.80 
In addition, while implanting microchips in employees may invoke strong ethical 
concerns and ramifications, other implants such as digital wallets raise more 
conventional security risks.81 There have been several prominent hacks of personal 
information over the last decade that have had dire economic consequences.82 Yet 
these relatively frequent hacks, directed to arguably less vital but more digitally 
secured domains than the self and human body, do not seem to have dissuaded the 
 
 76. The Fifth Industrial Revolution, as contemplated here, stands for an envisioned era of commonplace bio-
hacking that will follow the Fourth Industrial Revolution of wide-spread automation and artificial intelligence. 
See generally Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond, WORLD 
ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-
what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/. 
 77. Sarwant Singh, Transhumanism And The Future of Humanity: 7 Ways The World Will Change by 2030, 
FORBES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/2017/11/20/transhumanism-and-the-
future-of-humanity-seven-ways-the-world-will-change-by-2030/#645dd0d07d79. 
 78. The slight benefit referenced here refers to the existence of a common cybersecurity and data privacy 
scheme across the European Union which provides a degree of protection and certainty regarding compliance to 
European-facing individuals and entities. This contrasts with the United States where there is no federal 
regulatory scheme. See Danny Palmer, What is GDPR? Everything you need to know about the new general data 
protection regulations, ZDNET (May 17, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/gdpr-an-executive-guide-to-
what-you-need-to-know/; Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 
2019), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 79. Merrit Kennedy, Wisconsin Company Offers to Implant Chips in its Employees, NPR (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/25/539265157/wisconsin-company-plans-to-start-
implanting-chips-in-its-employees. 
 80. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 81. Emily Stewart, If bitcoin is so safe, why does it keep getting hacked?, VOX (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/8/18537073/binance-hack-bitcoin-stolen-blockchain-security-safu. The 
conventional digital wallet hacking considerations invoke here are equally pertinent for implantable digital 
wallets. Id. 
 82. See Victoria Cavaliere & Brian Fung, Equifax exposed 150 million Americans’ personal data. Now it 
will pay up to $700 million, CNN BUSINESS (July 22, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/22/tech/equifax-
hack-ftc/index.html; Brendan I. Koerner, Inside the Cyberattack That Shocked the US Government, WIRED (Oct. 
23, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/ (illustrating different 
examples of significant hacks in recent years). 
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rising industry of the digital wallet and associated cybernetic enhancement 
industry.83 
Digital wallets, implanted under the skin of an individual, invoke the need for data 
protections.84 However, who would bear responsibility for this data and its protection 
is unknown or ambiguous. On the one hand, financial institutions, presumably 
owning the account associated with the wallet, could take responsibility for 
protecting the digital wallet as a device and its accompanying data.85 On the other 
hand, implanted individuals could bear the responsibility for securing their own data 
as well through the purchase of network and device protection, like firewalls and 
general anti-hacking software, for their own body and implanted technology located 
therein.86 Currently, no conclusive answers nor federal guidelines exist to guide law 
and policymakers when making decisions regarding data security and privacy 
frameworks, particularly where new and emerging technologies are concerned.87 
Underscoring this lack of guidance, the GDPR does not contemplate cybernetics in 
its regulatory scope, thereby providing little instructional assistance.88 
Lastly, as somewhat discussed previously,89 law and policymakers must attempt 
to foresee the criminal implications of an event where body essential functions are 
hacked and compromised.90 Suppose a direct neural implant or brain-computer 
interface is hacked by malicious actors and this interface links to a prosthetic. In a 
scenario where these malicious actors seize control of the limb to perform a violent 
 
 83. Michael Moeser, 5 trends driving growth of digital wallets, PaymentsSource (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.paymentssource.com/list/5-trends-driving-growth-of-digital-wallets. 
 84. Digital wallets, by virtue of being an outgrowth of banking, invoke high levels of data security and 
protection as monetary security is paramount to the individual and the society to which said individual belongs 
to. See Stewart, supra note 81. 
 85. See Id. Should the responsibility for the data lie with the financial institution, regulation would operate 
like it currently does for banking applications and non-implantable wallets. 
 86. If the answer to this question is yes, then the framework would operate like current cyber insurance. See 
Abha Bhattarai, Cyber-insurance becomes popular among smaller, mid-size businesses, THE WASHINGTON POST 
(Oct. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/cyber-insurance-becomes-popular-
among-smaller-mid-size-businesses/2014/10/11/257e0d28-4e48-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html. 
 87. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 88. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. L 119/1. The regulation 
clearly sets out its scope as applying “to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means 
and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are 
intended to form part of a filing system”, none of which implicates the particular mechanisms of cybernetic 
implants. Id. 
 89. Supra II.A. 
 90. Id. 
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crime, there are no conclusive answers regarding who bears ultimate responsibility.91 
The responsibility could lie with the individual that physically accomplished the 
crime, in other words the implantee,92 or it could lie with the malicious actors, the 
implantors, which may give rise to attribution issues.93 Or, would the company, 
which may not have diligently reinforced its interface’s security protocols, bear 
ultimate fault.94 The law and general scholarship provide little clarity on the subject, 
but, as society approaches a present where ‘cyborgization’95 and potential 
omnipresence of cybernetic enhancements are a reality, law and policymakers need 
to be able to contemplate the extensive ramifications that such technology could 
have.96 Data protections must be strongly reinforced and regulatory clarity and 
scheme must be in place at the federal level.97 
III. PRIVATE SECTOR USE OF DATA: THE REGULATORY WILD-WEST 
A. Inadequate Personal Data Protection 
Data Privacy laws in the United States are sector-specific in nature and primarily 
state-based.98 These laws are solely focused on particular challenges and risks faced 
by individual sectors and industry, and do not take a ‘big picture’ view in their 
regulatory approaches.99 While this comment advocates for a cybernetic-focused 
approach when it comes to regulating their Data Privacy challenges,100 it also 
advocates a ‘big picture’ one as cybernetic enhancement technology encompasses a 
wide variety of applications across numerous industries, each with their own 
particularities.101 
The lack of comprehensive federal Data Privacy law is concerning in of itself, but 
particularly so when considering cybernetic enhancement technology.102 A citizen in 
 
 91. See Julia Alexander, The Prosthetic DEKA Arm Is Hackable and a Legal Mess, VICE (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvvvz/the-deka-arm-is-hackable-and-that-might-open-up-a-legal-can-of-
worms (discussing this exact dilemma in discussion with Weber Tobias). 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Benjamin Wittes & Jane Chong, Our Cyborg Future: Law and Policy Implications, BROOKINGS (Sep. 
2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/our-cyborg-future-law-and-policy-implications/. 
 96. Infra III.B. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Infra III.B. 
 101. Infra IV.C. 
 102. Infra III.B. 
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Florida103 will be subject to an entirely different set of protections and remedies than 
a citizen in California.104 Additionally, if the Data Privacy breach occurs across 
different states then protections and remedies will be severely lacking, not to mention 
that even where there may be protections, these may not be clear and may not have 
been subject to rigorous judicial interpretation yet.105 Moreover, States do not even 
focus on similar lenses when addressing Data Privacy.106 For example, in Maryland, 
the approach to cybersecurity and Data Privacy is focused on enacting minimum 
security standards, this reflects a proactive pre-incident approach.107 On the other 
hand, Florida’s Data Privacy laws are focused on the nature of the privacy of the data 
itself.108 This means that Florida’s legal frameworks are designed primarily around 
the recovery and post-securitization of data in the event of a breach.109 Consequently, 
it is much more reactive and focused on the exposure of weaknesses by a breach.110 
No state currently has a multi-faceted scheme that incorporates both styles of legal 
mechanisms.111 
In the fast-approaching world of cybernetic enhancement technology, the need for 
robust, clear, comprehensive Data Privacy law will never be stronger.112 Cybernetic 
enhancement technology, at its core, implicates the self.113 It is essentially wearable 
technology,114 using the Internet of Things,115 melded to one’s own body and 
therefore, eventually, an intricate part of the self and one’s identity.116 It is hard to 
 
 103. CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION 2019, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/cybersecurity-legislation-
2019.aspx. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 106. Id. 
 107. CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION 2019, Maryland. 
 108. CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION 2019, Florida. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See generally CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION 2019. 
 112. Infra III.B. 
 113. Cybernetic enhancements, being an integral part of the individual’s autonomy, by nature involve the 
sense of identity of the individual and are, thus, intensely personal. See Alex Pearlman, The Ethics of 
Experimentation: Ethical Cybernetic Enhancements, MEDIUM (June 19, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@lexikon1/the-ethics-of-experimentation-ethical-cybernetic-enhancements-48f9ad991769. 
 114. Much of the particularities and implications of bio-hacking and cybernetic implants are present in current 
wearable technology like smart watches and smart eyewear. See Steve Ranger, What is the IoT? Everything you 
need to know about the Internet of Things right now, ZDNET (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/what-
is-the-internet-of-things-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-iot-right-now/. 
 115. Id. The Internet of Things is used to refer to the interconnected systems of devices that collect and share 
data through the internet. Id. 
 116. Supra note 113. 
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nearly impossible to predict how law and policymakers would treat cybernetic 
enhancements when individuals believe that these enhancements are part of their 
body.117 The treatment of such unique issues could entail property rights or it could 
invoke First Amendment rights.118 State privacy laws are currently designed to be 
intentionally vague.119 For instance, State laws mandating minimum security 
standards frequently center around the following language: “reasonable security 
procedures and practices must be implemented.”120 However, there is lack of clarity 
surrounding what may be considered reasonable.121 More importantly, such statutory 
language, when litigated, is then interpreted by non-experts in cybersecurity which 
leads to further lack of clarity and potentially more confusion, and even nonsensical 
resolutions to potential issues.122 
At present, the wild-west state of Data Privacy regulatory frameworks within the 
United States is an untenable position.123 A robust, comprehensive federal Data 
Privacy framework must be in place in the near future.124 More specifically on the 
issue of cybernetic enhancement, the enactment of such a scheme is not enough.125 
For cybernetic enhancement and their more pointed challenges regarding Data 
Privacy, a complementary specific approach must also be enacted accompanying 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Courts have generally treated clothing as being protected by the First Amendment. Cybernetic 
enhancements, under the thought of being wearable technology, could also be treated under a similar concept. 
Presumably the treatment of cybernetic enhancements in this way would protect the data at the individual level. 
See Shira Stein, As a high school student during the Vietnam War, she wore her protest on her sleeve, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/as-a-high-school-
student-during-the-vietnam-war-she-wore-her-protest-on-her-sleeve/2017/12/14/ad4ffbfa-e10f-11e7-bbd0-
9dfb2e37492a_story.html; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court sides with ‘subversive’ clothing designer in First 




 119. See CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION 2019, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/cybersecurity-legislation-
2019.aspx (highlighting several state examples. Enacted legislation must be intentionally vague in order to 
encompass the widest berth of possible emerging issues and remain efficiently responsive). 
 120. DATA SECURITY LAWS – PRIVATE SECTOR, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (May 29, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx (listing 
at least 25 states incorporating variants of that language into their respective statutes). 
 121. The February 2016 California Attorney General’s Data Breach Report Sets a Standard for “Reasonable 
Security” – What does This Mean for Cybersecurity Litigation?, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (May 20, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/05/04_klein/. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 124. Infra III.B (discussing what ought to be addressed in a federal cybernetic framework). 
 125. Id. 
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such a federal framework.126 Cybernetic enhancement technology must be regulated 
based on a hybrid formula built on the computer network formula and the more 
personal GDPR model.127 
B. The Need for a Federal National Cybernetic Law 
As discussed, the United States does not, as of this moment, possess any federal 
privacy framework.128 All Data Privacy laws in the United States are sector-specific, 
State-law.129 A comprehensive robust and clear federal Data Privacy law must be 
enacted.130 However, for cybernetics, the issue and need go deeper.131 For cybernetic 
enhancement technology itself, a complementary just as robust and just as clear 
cybernetic-specific set of laws must also be enacted.132 
It is clear that privacy threats are constant and, that regardless of technology or 
industry, the federal laws must anticipate future threats.133 This constant is never 
clearer than when considering the cybernetic issue.134 The possibility and likelihood 
of abuse and breaches of personal data within this field are massive.135 If a 
cybernetic-equipped individual is considered a licensee,136 then this abuse of 
personal data would not even solely be within the realm of hackers and other various 
malicious actors, but also the province of the ultimate owner: a corporate entity.137 
In addition, for cybernetics, more traditional threats such as hacking and general 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Infra IV.C. 
 128. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. (demonstrating that this view is supported by the GAO). 
 131. Id. The issue and need go deeper where cybernetics are concerned as no real regulation, state or federal, 
is currently in place within the United States. Id. 
 132. Supra II.B. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Julia Alexander, The Prosthetic DEKA Arm Is Hackable and a Legal Mess, VICE (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvvvz/the-deka-arm-is-hackable-and-that-might-open-up-a-legal-can-of-
worms; Nickolaus Hines, Neural Implants Could Let Hackers Hijack Your Brain, INVERSE (Aug. 5, 2016), 
https://www.inverse.com/article/19148-neural-implants-could-let-hackers-hijack-your-brain; Alex Hern, 
Hacking risk leads to recall of 500,000 pacemakers due to patient death fears, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/31/hacking-risk-recall-pacemakers-patient-death-fears-fda-
firmware-update (demonstrating examples of the threat of cybernetic implant hacks). 
 136. The licensee theory stems from the idea that the device is the ultimate property of the corporate owner 
giving the implantee a more limited set of data rights. This theory is considered here to illustrate the need for 
comprehensive federal privacy legislation and complementary cybernetic ones. See Jayne Ponder, GAO Report 
Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-
privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/; supra note 85. 
 137. See supra note 85. 
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compromise of personal information must also be considered.138 As a result, it is 
essential, through this clear need, to have a specific federal cybernetic Data Privacy 
framework built upon a comprehensive robust federal Data Privacy regulatory 
scheme.139 
A federal privacy framework is necessary to ensure uniformity of purpose, 
protection, and remedy across the nation.140 A cybernetic-specific add-on scheme 
would strengthen protections and validate decisions by individuals to equip 
cybernetic enhancement technology to themselves knowing their data is secured.141 
Furthermore, with unity of laws and schemes, a global framework could then be built 
around the United States framework and the European GDPR framework that would 
further maximize data security and allow flexibility for advances in technology 
among the cybersecurity industry, specifically that of cybernetics.142 Future needs 
and technology can seldom be anticipated, but marrying two schemes, such as those 
contemplated, ensures a greater flexibility and a stronger responsiveness to 
unanticipated future needs without the need or challenge of constructing an entirely 
new legal framework and legal devices to address these future threats.143 
 
 138. See Emily Stewart, If bitcoin is so safe, why does it keep getting hacked?, VOX (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/8/18537073/binance-hack-bitcoin-stolen-blockchain-security-safu; Julia 
Alexander, The Prosthetic DEKA Arm Is Hackable and a Legal Mess, VICE (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvvvz/the-deka-arm-is-hackable-and-that-might-open-up-a-legal-can-of-
worms. 
 139. Infra IV.C. 
 140. Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 2019), 
https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/. 
 141. The lack of strong data security is one of the main concerns of bio-hackers. Should data be more robust 
and secured, it is highly likely that a strong increase in the availability of the technology and a more widespread 
practice of cybernetic device implantation would be observed. See generally Sigal Samuel, How biohackers are 
trying to upgrade their brains, their bodies – and human nature, VOX (Jun. 25, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/25/18682583/biohacking-transhumanism-human-augmentation-
genetic-engineering-crispr. 
 142. A global complementary scheme would assist in securing data against malicious actors and allow a 
robust cybersecurity framework to be built according to the peculiarities of the area seeking to be regulated. In 
other words, by building the framework as a complementary global engine, the scheme would have more ease 
regulating the fundamentally decentralized internet and digital realm. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. L 119/1. 
 143. Id. (showing that by being complementary and built to regulate a decentralized industry, the framework 
would be more responsive to future, unanticipated threats as the scheme could be continuously built upon). 
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IV. MODELS OF REGULATION FOR CYBERNETIC ENHANCEMENTS  
Data Privacy models are based around who bears ultimate responsibility in the 
event of security lapses.144 For the traditional computer network model, the 
responsibility lies with the cyber network owner.145 Whereas, the newly established 
European GDPR model puts more emphasis on the direct owner of the data (i.e. the 
individual).146 For cybernetic enhancement technology, neither approach is sufficient 
to address the inherent challenges of the technology.147 Instead, this comment 
advocates for a new approach, designed to incorporate elements of both models to 
withstand the possible risks present and future of such an industry.148 Under this 
hybrid model, securitization of data and ownership would be shared and, thus, result 
in a novel scheme.149 
A. The Computer Network Model 
The Computer Network Model is considered the traditional approach to 
cybersecurity legislation and protective schemes.150 Since the advent of the Internet 
and personal computers, and associated challenges, this is the scheme that has been 
enacted to ensure protection.151 
Under this model, responsibility for securing networks and data lies with the 
ultimate network or server owner.152 For example, when the Office of Personnel 
Management (“OPM”) was breached153 and the data of numerous government 
 
 144. Id. Frequently, this lies with the server owner, individual, or sometimes insurance company that insured 
the network. See Id. 
 145. Infra IV.A; see Jayne Ponder, GAO Report Calls for Federal Privacy Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (Feb. 24, 
2019), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/gao-report-calls-for-federal-privacy-law/; DATA SECURITY 
LAWS – PRIVATE SECTOR, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (May 29, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx. The 
computer network model, where responsibility lies with the server owner is that more commonly used in non-
European jurisdictions. Id. 
 146. Infra IV.B; Tony Pepper, Whose data is it anyway? GDPR and the problem of data ownership, 
ITPROPORTAL (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.itproportal.com/features/whose-data-is-it-anyway-gdpr-and-the-
problem-of-data-ownership/. 
 147. Infra IV.C. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Julia Alexander, The Prosthetic DEKA Arm Is Hackable and a Legal Mess, VICE (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvvvz/the-deka-arm-is-hackable-and-that-might-open-up-a-legal-can-of-
worms. 
 151. Id. 
 152. DATA SECURITY LAWS – PRIVATE SECTOR, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (May 29, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/data-security-laws.aspx. 
 153. Brendan I. Koerner, Inside the Cyberattack That Shocked the US Government, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/. 
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employees was unlawfully accessed, the responsibility for the lack of securitization 
lay with the government, the owner of the server housing the data.154 Such a model 
is inadequate to address cybernetics.155 
Under this model, the regulation of cybernetic enhancements naturally supposes 
a linked cybernetic implant network.156 This network would need to be common to 
all similar implants.157 However, the key limitation would be that, since under the 
Computer Network Model responsibilities lies with the network owner, the implants 
and, consequently, the network would also have to belong to a single corporate entity 
that could be regulated, an arrangement that may encourage undesirable 
monopolistic behavior.158 
Such a model for cybernetic enhancements is inadequate due to there being a 
myriad of possible implants that may incorporate this technology.159 Furthermore, it 
is highly unlikely that a particular implant would solely be the province of a singular 
corporate entity.160 Similarly, due to the security risk presented by the Internet 
itself,161 it is not even certain that all implants would have a common network instead 
of a private network that may be housed under different entities.162 Consequently, 
basing legislation around such a model for cybernetics would leave too many security 
holes and would be unlikely to maximize protections.163 
B. The European Data Privacy Regulatory Model 
The European Data Privacy Regulatory Model is based around a multi-faceted 
approach where ultimate responsibility for different facets of Data Privacy does not 
necessarily lie with a corporate network owner.164 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Infra IV.C. 
 156. Id. If the network were unlinked, regulation would be unenforceable as there would be no common 
network owner. Under this supposition, government ownership of the ultimate network is most likely implicated. 
Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Id. 
 159. Infra II.A. 
 160. Id. If an implant has multiple uses and/or functions, different ultimate owners might be involved 
depending on the functions and data necessary. Id. 
 161. Julia Alexander, The Prosthetic DEKA Arm Is Hackable and a Legal Mess, VICE (June 3, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezvvvz/the-deka-arm-is-hackable-and-that-might-open-up-a-legal-can-of-
worms. 
 162. See Infra II.A. In other words, multiple complementary intranets serving common functions of 
independent, distinct implants. Id. 
 163. Infra IV.C. 
 164. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
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The GDPR entails different responsibilities regarding data collection and its 
purpose and data retention, and incorporates a “Right to be Forgotten” among its data 
erasure regulation.165 For cybernetic enhancements, these different segmented 
responsibilities and “Right to be Forgotten” would represent strong founding 
principles, but without complementary measures the GDPR and, importantly, these 
specific components, would be inadequate for a full regulatory scheme for cybernetic 
enhancement technology.166 
Under this type of model, cybernetic enhancement technology would be regulated 
in different segmented parts.167 Regulation would be based on the segment, and based 
on that segment, ultimate responsibility for the data would be established.168 
Subsection 1 of this section will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the 
GDPR Data Collection and Purpose component as applied to cybernetic 
enhancements.169 Subsection 2 of this section will discuss the same pertaining to the 
Data Retention component.170 Lastly, subsection 3 will discuss the “Right to be 
Forgotten” and Data Erasure and why, while it should be a primordial tenet of a 
future cybernetic enhancement regulatory scheme, it is inadequate without 
complementary cybernetic-specific measures.171 
1. Data Collection and Purpose 
Under the GDPR Model, Data Collection and its purpose would be a primordial 
segment around which regulation could be based.172 That is to say that collection for 
different types of purposes would be regulated differently.173 
With this model of regulation, public health and benefit would be highly 
considered among applicable regulations.174 If the cybernetic enhancement 
 
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. L 119/1; see infra note 
210. 
 165. Kristof Van Quathem et al., GDPR’s right to be forgotten limited to EU websites, INSIDE PRIVACY (Sep. 
25, 2019), https://www.insideprivacy.com/eu-data-protection/gdprs-right-to-be-forgotten-limited-to-eu-
websites/. 
 166. Infra IV.C. 
 167. Infra IV.B.1; IV.B.2; IV.B.3 (the segmented parts referred to are the three core functions of data 
collection, retention, and deletion). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Infra IV.B.1. 
 170. Infra IV.B.2. 
 171. Infra IV.B.3. 
 172. Robin Kurzer, The story of data, Part 3: Who owns it?, MARTECH TODAY (May 22, 2018), 
https://martechtoday.com/the-story-of-data-part-3-who-owns-it-215922. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Elisabethann Wright, Digital health: Understanding the new responsibilities facing life sciences 
companies related to collecting and processing personal health data under the GDPR, HOGAN LOVELLS 
PUBLICATIONS (July 12, 2018), https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/understanding-the-new-
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technology is used for a primary health purpose and data is collected to that end, then 
that data’s ownership may ultimately lie with the corporate implant owner and not 
the equipped individual.175 The public health purpose of the data collection would 
implicate the need to have access to the data for research and health maximization 
purposes, a greater good approach, which means that the data is more easily 
obtained.176 Conversely, because it is more easily accessed, it is more easily 
breached.177 This type of data would need to be secured strongly against outward 
invasion, yet internally porous enough to allow lawful examination of the 
information.178 More importantly, under this scheme, the data, personal as it may be, 
would not belong to the individual from whom it had been obtained.179 Thus, 
responsibility in the event of breaches and lack of security would lie with the 
corporate entity most benefiting from the unfettered access to this data.180 
On the other hand, if the cybernetic enhancement has a primary cosmetic or 
quality of life purpose, for example better eyesight, then this data may actually 
belong to the equipped individual.181 The data collected and absorbed through this 
use would not possess a strong public health benefit, therefore under the GDPR 
model, this data would primarily belong to the equipped individual.182 That is to say, 
and reinforce that once sale and implantation occurs, the data ceases to be within the 




 175. See supra IV.C. In this view, the stronger the public health benefit procured by the data, the weaker the 
personal data protections of said collected data. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See Lily Hay Newman, A Zoom Flaw Gives Hackers Easy Access to Your Webcam, WIRED (July 9, 
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/zoom-bug-webcam-hackers/. The more accessible the information, the 
more easily accessible it is for everyone, including malicious actors. Id. 
 178. Such a scheme would resemble national hospital networks and the data they secure within. However, 
these networks are still breached frequently. See Jessica Kim Cohen, Healthcare data breaches reach record 
high in April, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/cybersecurity/healthcare-data-breaches-reach-record-high-april. 
 179. Supra note 175. 
 180. Id. Putting it another way, either the government or the research entity using the data for public 
health/benefit purposes. Id. 
 181. See Id. 
 182. Id. As articulated in note 173, the weaker the public health purpose, the stronger the private data 
protections. Thus, when the enhancement and data are collected primarily for cosmetic or quality of life purposes, 
the data would likely lie with the implantee. Id. 
 183. Id. That is to say, once sale and implantation occurs, full property rights over the data are conferred to 
the implantee. Id. 
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The limitation of such a model is clear: a purpose-focused approach and inquiry 
does not provide enough clarity.184 For cybernetic enhancement technology there are 
a multitude of purposes to which the technology may be put to use.185 More 
importantly, a single cybernetic enhancement may have a variety of non-clearly 
delineated purposes.186 Such a scenario would result in an intense fact-specific 
inquiry to establish responsibility that may result in inconsistent resolutions across 
different litigation.187 Further, inconsistent resolutions would lead to uncertainty 
among consumers, which would correspondingly weaken the industry and result in 
less benefit derived from the technology.188 
2. Data Retention 
Data Retention under the GDPR model is focused on length.189 For example, a 
corporate entity, such as Google, has the ability and right to retain an individual’s 
data for a limited amount of time, at which point the data is no longer kept and is 
effectively ‘returned’ to the individual.190 
For cybernetic enhancement technology, this is insufficient.191 Due to the 
technology’s very nature as heavily involved in the self and one’s possible identity, 
data collected, and therefore retained from such technology, is inherently personal.192 
Under this model, having intensely personal data retained by impersonal corporate 
actors can feel almost like a violation, particularly when such data is health-
related.193 Uncertainties of this model could include whether the retained data could 
be sold to a third party during the limited proscribed period or whether entities, such 
as insurance companies, could be owner and retainer of the data.194  
 
 184. Id. This model would necessitate a fact-specific inquiry that might result in contradictory or ambiguous 
results. This lack of clarity would then implicitly weaken the protections present in the model. Id. 
 185. Supra II.A. 
 186. Supra II.A.4 (discussing that a single brain-computer interface may have several, distinct, and non-
overlapping functions). 
 187. Supra note 184. 
 188. Id. 
 189. William Long & Vishnu Shankar, The impact of the GDPR on the retention of personal data, IAPP (Sep. 
2016), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/GDPR-retention-sidley-september-2016-1516.pdf. 
 190. Id. (“[B]usinesses must affirmatively delete or return personal data – or retain data such that it is not 
‘personal’ – if retaining such data is not essential for the purposes for which the data was collected.”). 
 191. Infra IV.C. 
 192. Supra note 113. 
 193. See supra notes 175; 177; 178. 
 194. Id. Such a possibility is an alarming one to consider from a medical and health perspective. With the 
multitude of data sets that cybernetic enhancements could collect, insurance companies could minutely tailor 
plans and premium costs to individuals using factors and data that the individuals themselves might not even be 
aware of. In turn, this would essentially render insurance companies akin to casinos where the odds are always 
in favor of the house. Id. 
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The possibility of such a scheme raises many questions, and these questions point 
to the difficulty of embracing such a model for this type of technology.195 Personal 
data, being so intricate to one’s sense of self, necessitates a level of protection and 
securitization above that provided by an impersonal corporate entity, even if such 
data is only retained for a limited amount of time.196 The nature of the data invites 
abuse.197 The data cannot possess maximized protection and safety unless it is solely 
retained by the individual.198 
3. Right to be Forgotten and Data Erasure 
The GDPR model allows for individuals to request corporate entities to 
permanently delete their data, and thus be “forgotten” by the corporate entity.199 This 
component of the GDPR Data Privacy regulatory scheme ought to be a core feature 
of any federal Data Privacy framework and more precisely a federal cybernetic-
focused legislation.200 
In the case of cybernetic enhancement technology, this feature would allow for a 
far more advanced measure of comfort among consumers than if data disposal was 
the sole province of a corporate entity for the reasons discussed in the previous sub-
section.201 Under this model, more responsibility would be placed with the 
individual.202 This extended measure of control would then ensure that, should 
consumers have concerns about particular aspects of their data being present on an 
impersonal server, they could request to have it disposed of with all haste.203 Such a 
measure would be key in the event that the individual’s data is mandated to be present 
on an impersonal server but a breach occurs resulting in the individual’s concern 
regarding misappropriation of their data to be heightened.204 This measure of the 
 
 195. Id. Particularly the possibility that data connected to one’s identity and sense of self could no longer be 
one’s own property if the greater good demanded it be made publicly available. Id. 
 196. See Long & Shankar supra note 190. 
 197. Id. Depending on the scrutiny and the burden of proof given to a case involving a claimed public benefit, 
weaker claims may survive, and the individual may sacrifice their legal rights to their data for the greater good. 
Id. 
 198. Infra IV.C. 
 199. Kristof Van Quathem et al., GDPR’s right to be forgotten limited to EU websites, INSIDE PRIVACY (Sep. 
25, 2019), https://www.insideprivacy.com/eu-data-protection/gdprs-right-to-be-forgotten-limited-to-eu-
websites/. 
 200. See Id. This would enable implantees/equipped individuals to request, within a proscribed period of time, 
that data related to their cybernetic implant be erased and that sole control of said data is within their hands. Id. 
 201. See supra IV.B.1; IV.B.2. 
 202. Infra IV.C. 
 203. Kristof Van Quathem et al., GDPR’s right to be forgotten limited to EU websites, INSIDE PRIVACY (Sep. 
25, 2019), https://www.insideprivacy.com/eu-data-protection/gdprs-right-to-be-forgotten-limited-to-eu-
websites/. 
 204. Supra note 178 (stating that medical data is the focal point in terms of concern should a breach occur). 
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model strongly aids in marrying the public interest of mostly unfettered access to an 
individual’s data that has public health benefits and the interests of the individual 
that wishes to keep their personal data strongly secured.205 Among the cybernetic 
enhancement industry, this should be a central tenet.206 
C. The Hybrid Cybernetic Model 
The Hybrid Cybernetic Model advocated for in this comment seeks to incorporate 
elements of both systems and models of regulation.207 The proposed model seeks to 
specifically meld the overall network security aspect of the Computer Network 
Model208 with the more specific aspects of the GDPR model, particularly the “Right 
to be Forgotten.”209 Correspondingly, cybernetic enhancements must be regulated at 
the network and implant and individual level.210 
Under the Hybrid Cybernetic Model, the unique nature and standpoint of 
cybernetic enhancement technology would be recognized where regulation is 
concerned.211 The nature of such technology demands that the several networks on 
which these implants will operate need to be secured.212 Furthermore, the devices 
themselves need to have strong security protocols in place to ensure that individual 
devices not be breached notwithstanding a lack of network breach.213 Like the 
Computer Network Model, these ‘big picture’ notions need to be the responsibility 
of the network owner and device manufacturer, in most cases these two entities being 
one and the same.214 The requirement of strong device-based security protocols, and 
the responsibility for such protocols lying with the network owners and device 
manufacturers, will ensure that sophisticated actors can secure the networks and 
devices to the highest potential degree and allow individuals to fully benefit from 
 
 205. Supra note 175 (finding a compromise between the public health benefit procured and the interests of 
the individual in having their private data secured). 
 206. Infra IV.C. 
 207. Supra IV.A; IV.B. 
 208. Supra IV.A. 
 209. Supra IV.B.3. 
 210. Id. In other words, regulation should occur separately regarding the network (where responsibility is 
incumbent upon the corporate owner), the implant itself (where responsibility for security features would be 
incumbent upon the merchant/retailer who may or may not be the network owner), and the individual who would 
be responsible for insuring his data and acting reasonably in securing his data from malicious actors. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Supra IV.A; see notes 156; 162. 
 213. Id. Meaning that, if malicious actors attempt to bypass hacking the network and instead attempt to breach 
individual devices, strong security protocols must be in place to thwart all but the most sophisticated attacks. Id. 
 214. Supra IV.A. 
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these without fear of their data being compromised by low-level actors due to a lack 
of expertise when it came to securing the network.215 
Where the data itself is concerned however, aspects of the GDPR must be more 
fully embraced.216 While security of the devices and network must by necessary 
expertise belong to the corporate entities building the networks and manufacturing 
the devices, the data must be the sole responsibility of individuals.217 Under this 
Hybrid Cybernetic Model, individuals implanted with cybernetic enhancements must 
have sole undivided control of their own data, management and collection of such 
data (although it may be facilitated by corporate entities), and the disposal thereof.218 
The data erasure and “Right to be Forgotten” concepts of the GDPR must be fully 
embraced in any cybernetic enhancement regulatory framing due to the intensely 
personal nature of the data.219 The unfiltered control of the data by the individual 
while the network and device on which the data operates is fully secured by an expert 
corporate entity marries the best aspects of both models and is uniquely suited to the 
particular nature of the technology.220 
For cybernetic enhancement technology, a similar model to this advocated for 
Hybrid Cybernetic Model must be embraced to encapsulate the unique nature of the 
risks, challenges, and nature of the technology itself.221 
V. CONCLUSION 
Technology’s exponential advance and comparative lackluster movement in Data 
Privacy laws and regulations have resulted in a crossroads for society. Without 
implementation of a Federal Data Privacy framework, followed by a specific 
complementary hybrid cybernetic scheme, Data Privacy will remain at the mercy of 
private actors. Within the next 10 to 15 years as personal body modification 
technology becomes more common, a lack of privacy laws will naturally mean and 
prove an obstacle and limit to these technologies. 
 
 
 215. Id. This will aid in marrying the expertise of industry operatives and the interests of private individuals 
in the securitization of their own data. Id. 
 216. Supra IV.B. 
 217. Supra IV.B.3. 
 218. Supra IV.B. 
 219. Supra IV.B.3; see note 113. 
 220. Supra note 210. 
 221. Id. 
